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Crossley: Ending-Life Decisions: Some Disability Perspectives

ENDING-LIFE DECISIONS: SOME DISABILITY
PERSPECTIVES
Mary Crossley*
INTRODUCTION
My contribution to this symposium on “Quinlan at 40: Exploring
the Right to Die in the U.S.” considers the challenges to end-of-life
decision-making that disability poses. I am perhaps an odd choice to
offer the disability perspective on this or any topic, as I am able
bodied and of sound mind, at least for the moment. For the past thirty
years, however, I have puzzled over how people with disabilities
experience the health care system in this country and how the health
care system experiences people with disabilities.1 Either I am not
very good at puzzles of this sort, or it is a really tough puzzle, or
perhaps both. In any event, I am still struggling with it. The topic
continues to engage me, because, to my mind, understanding what it
means to be disabled is an inextricable part of understanding what it
means to be human. In offering these perspectives, I do not speak for
people with disabilities. Instead, this essay simply offers my
understanding of views commonly expressed by members of the
disability community.
My starting premise is that disability lies at the heart of questions
about making ending-life decisions2 simply because most people
whose lives end as the result of a decision to withhold or terminate
*
Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This essay benefited from valuable comments
offered by participants at the Symposium “Quinlan at 40: Exploring the Right to Die in the U.S.”
1. Beginning with Mary A. Crossley, Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns: An
Analysis, 6 MED. & L. 499 (1987).
2. The choice of how to refer to decisions about medical interventions that sustain or end life is
itself disputed. See Tom Koch, The Ethicist as Language Czar, or Cop: “End of Life” v. “Ending Life,”
25 HEC Forum 345, 346 (2013) (suggesting that language used in bioethical arguments is itself
prejudicial). Although the more common usage is “end-of-life” decisions, in this essay I prefer to use
“ending-life” decisions. Particularly in cases involving persons whose disabilities do not pose an
imminent threat to their lives, a decision to refuse life-sustaining medical interventions is better
understood as a decision that ends life, rather than as a decision that occurs proximate to an already
imminent end to life.
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medical treatment or to seek active medical assistance in dying are
disabled.3 Many persons whose lives end through such a conscious
choice may have become disabled only near the end of their life,
although some may have been disabled for many years or their entire
lives. By and large, discussions of the right to die have not been
about able-bodied, mentally competent people choosing to die.4 Our
society remains profoundly uncomfortable with the idea that an ablebodied, healthy person would voluntarily direct her own death. But
something about infirmity, and the loss of function and
independence, sometimes but not always coupled with the conviction
that death is imminent anyway, make the decision to go ahead and
die—or let die—acceptable. I do not argue that this judgment—
whether intuitive or the product of moral reasoning—is necessarily
wrong. I am convinced, however, that disability, or fear of disability,
is nearly always part of the ending-life calculus, whether
acknowledged or not.
In the forty years since Quinlan,5 disability has occasionally been
present in the conversation within medicine, bioethics, and law about
the acceptability of death-hastening medical decisions, but it has at
times been viewed as an interloper,6 an uninvited guest to the party,
or perhaps the guest whom the host was obliged to invite, but whose
presence was not entirely welcomed. Notwithstanding some shortterm reversals and counter-currents, the steady arc of end-of-life law
during the past four decades has been towards liberalization of
ending-life choices by and for patients who are severely

3. The most notable exception to this generalization involves persons facing life-threatening
medical circumstances whose refusal of medical care or particular interventions is religiously motivated.
See, e.g., Application of President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
reh’g en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Pub. Health
Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
4. See Ian Basnett, Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Toward and Decisions Affecting
Disabled People, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 450, 455–56 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds.,
2001).
5. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
6. See Carol J. Gill, No, We Don’t Think Our Doctors Are out to Get Us: Responding to the Straw
Man Distortions of Disability Rights Arguments Against Assisted Suicide, 3 DISABILITY & HEALTH J.
31, 36 (2010) (noting the irony of “assisted suicide proponents view[ing] disability advocates as
interlopers in these matters”).
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compromised or near the end of their lives.7 During that time, many
leading thinkers and activists in the disability community have
questioned that liberalization.8 My sense is that physicians,
bioethicists, and lawyers have sometimes viewed disability
advocates’ questioning as marginal, if not bordering on the paranoid,
or as the product of manipulation by other interest groups.9 Disability
concerns may be perceived as distracting attention from broadly held
values and interfering with progress. As a result, discussions about
ending-life decisions within the bioethics, medicine, and law
communities and those within the disability community too often
proceed along parallel tracks, rather than directly engaging with each
other. I contend that, because most ending-life decisions are made by
or for disabled persons, persons with disabilities must be included at
the center of conversations about the meaning of and limits on those
decisions.10
This essay does two things. First, it briefly describes the nature of
and basis for disability concerns about the liberalization of endinglife decisions.11 This account is largely descriptive and explanatory,
summarizing the reasons for the apprehension that many in the
disability community experience surrounding treatment termination
and physician-aided dying. I offer this account recognizing both that
I am not a person with a disability and that people with disabilities
have diverse views on these issues. Second, this essay considers how
recent conversations about racial justice issues in policing and
criminal justice, promoted by the Black Lives Matter movement,
among others, might offer parallels to the concerns of disability
7. See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663–64 (starting the arc when the court held that the guardian of
a woman in a non-cognitive, vegetative state could assert the woman’s right of privacy and thereby end
her life).
8. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Critical Essay: Musings on the Need to Convince Some People with
Disabilities That End-of-Life Decision Making Advocates Are Not out to Get Them, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
343, 345 (2006).
9. Cf. Cerminara, supra note 8, at 371–73 (suggesting that disability advocates may have been
manipulated by right-to-life activists during the Schiavo case).
10. Accord Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End of Life Reform
Uphold a Disabled Person’s Interest in Continued Life?, HASTINGS CTR. RPT., (SPECIAL REPORT) S31,
S36 (2005).
11. See infra Part I.
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advocates.12 To my mind, these parallels help explicate the concerns
of disability activists and reveal them as deeply imbued with social
justice commitments.
I. SUMMARIZING DISABILITY CONCERNS ABOUT ENDING-LIFE
DECISIONS
To be clear, people with disabilities have diverse views about
terminating life-sustaining treatment and assisted dying.13 As a
consequence of living with impairments that limit their ability to
function typically and often provoke discomfort, and even fear
among members of the majority, people with disabilities have a
distinctive perspective. That perspective is not monolithic, however,
just as no single, all-encompassing “disability community” exists.14
Much of the experience of living with a communication disorder
differs from that of living with blindness, an anxiety disorder,
quadriplegia, or an intellectual disability. The experience shared by
people with diverse disabilities, however, is that of being excluded,
socially isolated, devalued, and dismissed by the dominant culture
and the physical, social, and economic structures that culture builds.15
Those shared experiences provide the foundation on which disability
studies scholars, disability rights organizations, and disability
activists build their work.16
This part seeks to summarize the views commonly articulated by
major disability groups, disability theorists, and disability activists
for readers who may not be steeped in disability theory or
accustomed to thinking from a disability viewpoint.17
12. See infra Part II.
13. See Cerminara, supra note 8, at 372; Alicia Ouellette, Context Matters: Disability, the End of
Life, and Why the Conversation Is Still So Difficult, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 371, 375 (2013).
14. Cf. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Becoming Disabled, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/opinion/sunday/becoming-disabled.html (noting that most people
do not see people with different disabilities as having a shared social identity or political status).
15. See Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3 ISSUES L. &
MED. 141, 141–42 (1987); W. Thomas Smith et al., Disability in Cultural Competency Pharmacy
Education, 75 AM. J. PHARM. EDUC. 1, 2 (2011).
16. See Longmore, supra note 15, at 147–48.
17. I view my role in writing this essay as that of a guide or teacher, not an advocate. The essay
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At its core, much of the concern that the disability community
expresses regarding ending-life decisions flows from a lack of trust
and confidence that all persons and institutions involved in those
decisions will respect the experiences, values, and welfare of people
with disabilities.18 The apprehension that their lives may be devalued
extends to physicians, courts, society, and even family members.19 In
the experience of many people with disabilities, the strands of
concern that I describe below are woven tightly into a fabric of
unease, but I will present them strand by strand, starting with
concerns about physicians and the health care system.
A. A History of Discrimination by Medicine and Public Health
Historical examples abound of instances where physicians, public
health officials, and government programs have discriminated
against, abused, or isolated people with disabilities, often with
society’s sanction. Pictures from this hall of shame are familiar: the
photo of Virginian Carrie Buck, who—like more than 60,000 other
Americans believed to be feebleminded, disabled, or otherwise unfit
to reproduce—was sterilized without her consent, all in the name of a
eugenic vision of public health that endured from the 1920s until well
after the end of World War II.20 The Supreme Court upheld
Virginia’s eugenic sterilization law with Justice Holmes’ ringing
endorsement: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”21
The images from the 1970s of disabled youth in wretched
conditions at Willowbrook State School in New York also come to
mind. For many years, physicians were complicit in the mistreatment
of people with disabilities, including involuntary institutionalization
seeks to enlarge the readers’ understanding, not to convince them that the views described are “right” in
an absolute sense or that contrary views are “wrong.” That said, I personally believe that the views
described are rational, well founded, and deserving of greater heed.
18. For two legal scholars’ accounting of the experiences of patients with disabilities and these
concerns, see Ouellette, supra note 13, at 379–85; Elizabeth Pendo, What Patients with Disabilities
Teach Us About the Everyday Ethics of Health Care, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 292–93 (2015).
19. See infra Sections I.A, I.B, I.C.
20. See generally PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008).
21. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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and forced medical procedures.22 Willowbrook State School, with its
history of inhumane treatment of and experimentation on children
with intellectual disabilities, is symbolic of physician mistreatment of
disabled people, much as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study is for black
people.23
In the 1980s, the public became aware of another example of
physicians supporting death-dealing decisions for vulnerable persons
with disabilities.24 Significant media attention focused on the story of
Baby Doe, an infant born with Down Syndrome, whose parents chose
not to authorize routine surgery to correct an esophageal blockage
and instead permitted their infant to die of starvation.25 Baby Doe
was not an isolated case. So-called “selective nontreatment” for
disabled newborns was described in one medical journal as the
“highest form of medical ethic,”26 and surveys showed significant
physician support for the practice.27
For decades, systemic, government-sanctioned practices isolated
people with disabilities in institutions where they had little or no
opportunity to participate in community life or to pursue educational
or economic opportunities.28 The societal stigma attached to
disability contributed to and reinforced Medicaid’s preference for
institution-based long-term care services, which required people with
disabilities to live in institutions to receive needed supportive and
22. See Remembering an Infamous New York Institution, NPR (Mar. 7, 2008, 7:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=87975196.
23. Residents of Willowbrook reportedly were intentionally exposed to the hepatitis virus as part of
an experiment. See id.; David J. Rothman, Were Tuskegee & Willowbrook ‘Studies in Nature’?, in
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Apr. 1982, at 5–6 (comparing the two experiments); see generally DAVID GOODE
ET AL., A HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE WILLOWBROOK STATE SCHOOL (2013).
24. See, e.g., Down’s Syndrome Baby Barred from Food Dies, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1982, 1982
WLNR 58354.
25. Id. The case of Baby Doe was also the impetus for several efforts at the federal level to regulate
medical decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment for disabled newborns, ultimately resulting in
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 51025106 (2016)). The Child Abuse Amendments required states to pass laws requiring the reporting of and
responding to instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment for disabled infants with lifethreatening conditions. See generally Steven R. Smith, Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child Abuse
Amendments: Tenuous Protection, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 765 (1986).
26. John M. Freeman, Is There a Right to Die—Quickly?, 80 J. PEDIATRICS 904, 905 (1972).
27. I. David Todres et al., Pediatricians’ Attitudes Affecting Decision-Making in Defective
Newborns, 60 PEDIATRICS 197, 201 (1977).
28. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 23.
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medical services.29 The emergence of the independent living
movement in the 1970s challenged the concept of institutions as the
presumptive setting for disabled life and medical care and
contributed to Medicaid revisions permitting increased coverage of
more home- and community-based services.30 It was not until 1999,
however, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead recognized
that, in cases where institutional care is unnecessary and undesired, a
state’s failure to provide services in a community setting constitutes
disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.31 Despite Olmstead, Medicaid’s historic structural
bias in favor of institutional care persists.32 Although allocation of
Medicaid funding varies from state to state, in 2013 more than thirty
states devoted less than half of their long-term care spending to
home- and community-based services.33
Even today, many physicians’ offices remain largely inaccessible
to people with disabilities.34 The New York Times recently described
a study in which a physician called more than 250 specialists, seeking
to refer a hypothetical patient who was partially paralyzed, used a
wheelchair, and weighed 200 pounds.35 The specialists’ responses to
29. See Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care: Lessons from
Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 955, 958 (2010).
30. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 921, 987 (2003); Watson, supra note 29, at 958–59; see also Chava Willig Levy, A
People’s History of the Independent Living Movement, INDEP. LIVING INST. (1998),
http://www.independentliving.org/docs5/ILhistory.html.
31. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600–01 (1999).
32. Watson, supra note 29, at 968.
33. ERICA L. REAVES & MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND LONGTERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS: A PRIMER (2015), http://kff.org/report-section/medicaid-and-longterm-services-and-supports-a-primer-report-dec-2015/#endnote_link_172646-27.
For
historical
background regarding the coverage of home and community-based services (HCBS) under the Medicaid
program, see Laura D. Hermer, Rationalizing Home and Community-Based Services Under Medicaid, 8
ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 61, 63–72 (2014).
34. See Michelle A. Meade et al., The Intersection of Disability and Healthcare Disparities: A
Conceptual Framework, 35 DISABILITY & REHAB. 632, 637 (2015) (citing studies that show “a
significant number of healthcare offices remain both inaccessible . . . with regard to physical barriers as
well as the training provided to office staff” and that “the majority of primary care physicians, dentists
and psychologists continue to work out of offices that are minimally accessible . . .”).
35. Pauline W. Chen, Disability and Discrimination at the Doctor’s Office, N.Y. TIMES: WELL BLOG
(May 23, 2013, 3:56 PM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/disability-and-discrimination-atthe-doctors-office/?_r=0. The results of the research were published in Tara Lagu et al., Access to
Subspecialty Care for Patients with Mobility Impairment: A Survey, 158 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 441,
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the referral request were disturbing. Fewer than ten percent of the
specialists had appropriate equipment, eighteen percent reported not
having trained staff to provide care for the patient, and twenty
percent refused to even schedule an appointment.36 Other sources
confirm that people with disabilities continue to face pervasive
problems of access when they seek medical care.37
These examples illustrate how biases against people with
disabilities have colored the history of, and still persist within, the
health and medical systems in the United States. Despite advances in
cultural attitudes toward disability, the health care system often
remains a space that many people with disabilities perceive as neither
welcoming nor supportive. They attribute that perception at least in
part to both anecdotal and empirical evidence that many doctors hold
negative views of disabled life, as described below.
B. Physicians’ Negative Views of Disabled Life
What does it mean to say that many physicians have negative
views of disabled life? Reading the work of disability scholars,
advocates, and activists suggests several aspects of an encounter
between a physician and a patient with a disability that can help
unpack that statement. This work describes evidence that physicians
view disabled persons’ quality of life as lower than the quality that
persons with disabilities actually experience. It also suggests that
physicians are often inadequately trained to understand the
experience of disability and that the incurability of many disabilities
may challenge physicians’ self-conceptions as effective healers.

443 (2013).
36. Lagu, supra note 35, at 443.
37. Nancy R. Mudrick et al., Physical Accessibility in Primary Health Care Settings: Results from
California On-Site Reviews, 5 DISABILITY & HEALTH J. 159, 159, 165 (2012) (reporting significant
access barriers from survey of facilities serving Medicaid patients in California); see also Winnie Hu,
Lawsuit Says Bronx Health Center Turns Away Patients with Physical Disabilities, N.Y. TIMES (July
30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/nyregion/lawsuit-says-bronx-health-center-turns-awaypatients-with-physical-disabilities.html (reporting on allegations that a health center was “riddled with
physical access barriers” and failed to provide sign language interpreters for deaf patients or modify
written materials for visually-impaired patients).
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Several studies reveal that physicians’ estimates of the negative
impact disabilities have on the quality of a person’s life diverge from
the self-reported experience of people with disabilities.38 Doctors
asked about the quality of life that disabled patients can be expected
to enjoy tend to estimate the quality as low, even though many people
with disabilities report a quality of life that rivals that of non-disabled
people.39 As a result, doctors may underestimate the value that a
disabled patient obtains from receiving treatment that addresses a
medical need without “fixing” their underlying impairment.
Moreover, physicians’ judgments that incorporate negative
assumptions about disability’s impact on a person’s life—for
example, that disabled persons are not sexually active—may
endanger a patient’s health.40
Physicians’ incomplete and skewed understanding of the lived
experience of disability results in part from a lack of education.
Medical training has not traditionally devoted attention to providing
trainees with balanced information about the experience of life with
disability.41 As a result, societal biases—rather than accurate and
balanced information—are permitted to supply the basis for many
doctors’ understanding of disability.42 In addition, a lack of
disability-oriented training may leave physicians ill-equipped to meet
the full range of disabled patients’ health-related needs.43 This lack of

38. See, e.g., John R. Bach, Threats to “Informed” Advance Directives for the Severely Physically
Challenged?, 84 ARCHIVES PHYS. MED. & REHAB. S23, S23 (2003) (study of ventilator users with
neuromuscular conditions); Kenneth A. Gerhart et al., Quality of Life Following Spinal Cord Injury:
Knowledge and Attitudes of Emergency Care Providers, 23 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 807 (1994)
(study of spinal-cord injury victims with quadriplegia); cf. Saroj Saigai et al., Self-Perceived Health
Status and Health-Related Quality of Life of Extremely Low-Birth-Weight Infants at Adolescence, 276 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 453 (1996); Gary L. Albrecht & Patrick J. Devlieger, The Disability Paradox: High
Quality of Life Against All Odds, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 977 (1999).
39. See Alison Davis, A Disabled Person’s Perspective on Euthanasia, 24 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 1,
2–3 (2004); A Point of View: Happiness and Disability, BBC NEWS (June 1, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27554754.
40. Tom Shakespeare, Lisa I. Iezzoni, & Nora E. Groce, The Art of Medicine: Disability and the
Training of Health Professionals, 374 LANCET 1815, 1816 (2009).
41. Lisa I. Iezzoni & Linda M. Long-Bellil, Training Physicians About Caring for Persons with
Disabilities: “Nothing About Us Without Us!”, 5 DISABILITY AND HEALTH J. 136, 136 (2012).
42. See id.
43. See id.
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knowledge prevents effective health care for people with disabilities,
and disabled patients frequently perceive that inadequacy.44
Disability studies scholars suggest another explanation for the
medical profession’s lack of careful attention to the full spectrum of
health needs presented by people with disabilities.45 Those scholars
offer medicine’s “myth of control” to help explain what they view as
medicine’s devaluation of disabled life.46 The idea is that doctors
historically have viewed their role as curing or fixing dysfunctional
and defective bodies,47 and that “unfixable” bodies challenge that
role.48 According to this explanation, caring for people with
incurable, disabling conditions may prove demoralizing to
physicians, who may seek to avoid patients with disabilities as a
result.49 Or, lacking familiarity with disabled people and their lives,
doctors simply may feel social discomfort and thus avoid addressing
how a patient’s disability relates to other health concerns.50 Or,
perhaps viewing a patient’s prospect of “success” as bleak when
disabilities cannot be remedied, physicians may even too readily
suggest an ending-life choice.51

44. Gloria L. Krahn, Deborah Klein Walker, & Rosaly Correa-De-Araujo, Persons with Disabilities
as an Unrecognized Health Disparity Population, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S198, S204 (2015).
45. See SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON
DISABILITY 94–96 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Cf. Stephanie M. Vertrees, Medical Humanities, Ethics, and Disability, 21 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 260, 263 (2012) (“[I]t is the abolition of illness that motivates
physicians . . . and . . . the concept of beneficence fundamentally assumes that there is ‘badness’ on
which ‘goodness’ must be affected.”).
48. Cf. Lisa I. Iezzoni, Going Beyond Disease to Address Disability, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 976,
977 (2006) (“Chronic disability can thwart physicians’ motivation to cure diseases.”); Shakespeare,
supra note 40, at 1815 (“Disabling conditions that cannot be cured or ‘normalised’, according to
standard societal norms, can be especially challenging for trainee health professionals.”).
49. Cf. Asch, supra note 10, at S33 (noting “the common discomfort of health care professionals in
the presence of patients with very significant impairments”).
50. Iezzoni, supra note 48, at 977 (“Disability becomes the elephant in the room—present, but
unmentioned.”).
51. Anita Silvers, Disability Discrimination: Risky Business for “Consenting” Adults, HASTINGS
CTR. (July 16, 2012, 10:33 AM), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/disability-discrimination-riskybusiness-for-consenting-adults/ (suggesting that a doctor presenting forgoing care as an option to a
patient with paralysis who was suffering from a life-threatening infection may have reflected the
doctor’s “compulsion to relieve his own discomfort about the dubiousness of success”).
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C. A View that Disabled Life is Burdensome on Families and State
Resources
Although members of the medical profession, like the general
public, may not know much about living with a disability, many in
the disability community believe physicians are keenly aware of
financial costs associated with providing support and care for people
with disabilities. A concern commonly voiced by members of the
disability community is that decisions about their medical care, and
particularly decisions about continuing or discontinuing treatment,
are made in the shadow of resource constraints and may be
influenced by a felt need to ration care.52
American society generally has been unwilling to embrace overt
systems of rationing medical care to bring rising medical costs under
control.53 Oregon’s effort in the early 1990s to devise a rationing
scheme as part of its Medicaid program is a notable exception.54
Oregon’s original rationing scheme, however, was rejected by the
federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on the
grounds that it conflicted with the Americans with Disabilities Act.55
The proposed scheme’s central criterion for covering medical
services was the comparative benefit that treatments for different
conditions would provide to Oregon’s population.56 Oregonians’
52. Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA’s Impact on Health Care for Persons with
Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 70–72 (2000).
53. See Leslie P. Scheunemann & Douglas B. White, The Ethics and Reality of Rationing in
Medicine, 140 CHEST J. 1625, 1625 (2011) (describing the controversial nature of rationing due to
fears regarding unfair treatment and the devaluing of human life).
54. Michael J. Garland, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon, 1 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 145–46
(1991) (describing a wide range of interest groups that support Oregon’s legislation and noting its
“broad public acceptability”).
55. Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., to Barbara Roberts, Governor
of Or. (Aug. 3, 1992), in Timothy B. Flanagan, ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, 9
ISSUES L. & MED. 397, 409–12 (1994) [hereinafter Sullivan Letter] (with accompanying three-page
“Analysis Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of the Oregon Reform Demonstration”).
For more in-depth discussion of Oregon’s proposal and the federal rejection of it, see Crossley, supra
note 52, at 75–76.
56. For a detailed account of the process by which Oregon developed its rationing scheme, see
generally Michael J. Garland, Rationing in Public: Oregon’s Priority-Setting Methodology, in
RATIONING AMERICA’S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 37–59 (Martin A. Strosberg
et al. eds., 1992).
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responses to survey questions about what they would count as a
benefit fed into the calculation of comparative benefit.57 In short,
Oregon was prepared to ration its Medicaid population’s care partly
based on the perceptions of non-disabled persons about the benefit of
life with disabling conditions.58 In rejecting Oregon’s application for
a Medicaid waiver permitting it to implement this rationing scheme,
Secretary of HHS Lewis Sullivan wrote:
The record regarding the manner in which the list of
condition/treatment pairs was compiled contains
considerable evidence that it was based in substantial part
on the premise that the value of the life of a person with a
disability is less than the value of the life of a person
without a disability. This is a premise which is inconsistent
with the ADA.59
The disability community was encouraged by the federal
government’s recognition that a rationing scheme overtly
subordinating the value of providing medical care to persons with
some disabling conditions was discriminatory.60 Ultimately,
however, the government’s rejection of Oregon’s rationing scheme
provided no reassurance that medical decisions made in individual
cases would not incorporate the same sorts of judgments.61 Instead,
the concern that medical choices for people with disabilities often
reflect implicit biases against disabled life and covert rationing is a
frequent refrain in writing by people with disabilities.62 Such
concerns exist when doctors offer advice or make decisions to limit

57. Id. at 44–46.
58. Sullivan Letter, supra note 55, at 410.
59. Id.
60. Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimination, 81 IOWA L. REV. 179, 199
(1995).
61. Chen, supra note 35.
62. See, e.g., Gill, supra note 6, at 34 (describing disabled people’s fear of doctors “who see our
lives as burdensome and who know little about options that make life with disability valuable . . . ,
[whose] misplaced pity and pessimism . . . is reinforced by . . . the health care funding system that
rewards them for holding costs down”).
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care, sometimes invoking the justification of medical futility.63 These
concerns also extend to choices made by family members acting as
surrogates for incompetent patients.64 Indeed, persons with
disabilities may themselves consider the crippling cost of their care
as one reason for choosing to discontinue life-sustaining medical
care.
D. Questions About the Primacy of Autonomy in the Context of
Unsupportive Living Arrangements
In light of the fact that people with disabilities sometimes
affirmatively choose to discontinue medical treatment, many
bioethicists and some members of the disability community
emphasize the importance of ensuring that people with disabilities
are empowered to make autonomous decisions about their medical
care.65 Respected voices from the disability community argue that
equal respect for people with disabilities demands their ability to
choose for themselves, based on whatever factors they deem
relevant.66 The primacy accorded to autonomy extends to choices for
patients who once had, but now have lost, decision-making
capacity.67 Those patients argue that respecting autonomy demands
that their previous expressions of values and preferences regarding
medical treatment and quality of life, made while competent, be
63. See generally Crossley, supra note 60; Philip G. Peters, When Physicians Balk at Futile Care:
Implications of the Disability Rights Laws, 91 NW. L. REV. 798 (1997).
64. Cf. Crossley, supra note 60.
65. See generally Gurit Lotan & Carolyn Ells, Adults with Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities and Participation in Decision Making, 48 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
112 (2010).
66. For example, attorney Andrew Batavia and historian Hugh Gallagher together published an open
online letter to people with disabilities, along with “A Declaration of Disability Rights,” both expressing
their views in support of people with disabilities’ ability to make private choices at the end of life,
including physician-assisted suicide. Drew Batavia & Hugh G. Gallagher, Gallagher and Batavia on
Physician-Assisted Suicide—An Open Letter to People with Disabilities, INDEP. LIVING INST.,
http://www.independentliving.org/docs1/gallbat.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2017); see also Anita Silvers,
Protecting the Innocents from Physician-Assisted Suicide: Disability Discrimination and the Duty to
Protect Otherwise Vulnerable Groups, in PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE 133
(M. Pabst Battin et al. eds., 1998).
67. See Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46 RUTGERS
L. REV. 609, 615–16 (1994); Lois Shepherd, The End of End-of-Life Law, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1693, 1699
(2014).
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given effect by their surrogates.68 Courts generally accept this
argument and adopt the approach that, in cases where a nowincompetent patient had previously clearly expressed treatment
preferences, substituted decision-making by a surrogate is
appropriate, and respect for the patient’s prior autonomous wishes
should be accorded primacy over attention to the patient’s current
welfare interests.69
Others in the disability community, however, are less sanguine
about the primacy of autonomy.70 While not necessarily diminishing
the value of autonomy in the abstract, they question whether the
choices that people with disabilities face actually resemble the
idealized notion of autonomous choice.71 These concerns are
particularly salient for a person disabled by sudden trauma, who must
abruptly transition from being able-bodied to facing severe
impairments.72 Expressions of desire to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment or technology, or even to pursue affirmatively life-ending
measures, soon after the disabling event are not unusual.73 Millions
of Americans watched a fictionalized account of such a scenario in
the closing scenes of the 2005 Academy Award-winning movie
Million Dollar Baby.74 In the movie, the young boxing champion
Maggie suffers an injury that leaves her paralyzed and dependent on
a ventilator, and she persuades her trainer to end her life.75
Members of the disability community roundly condemned the
movie as filled with inaccuracies about life with spinal cord injuries
68. See Dresser, supra note 67, at 615–16; Shepherd, supra note 67, at 1699. The situation presented
by patients who never have enjoyed decision-making capacity is different. See generally Norman L.
Cantor, The Relation Between Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons, 13
ANNALS HEALTH L. 37 (2004) (considering whether autonomy-based rights extend to never competent
persons in the context of end-of-life decisions).
69. Shepherd, supra note 67, at 1697–1704 (describing “the lay of the land” with respect to end-oflife law).
70. See Dresser, supra note 67, at 622.
71. See Asch, supra note 10, at S34.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. MILLION DOLLAR BABY (Warner Bros. 2004).
75. Million Dollar Baby Built on Prejudice About People with Disabilities, DISABILITY RIGHTS
EDUC. & DEF. FUND (Feb. 2005), https://dredf.org/2005/02/13/million-dollar-baby-built-on-prejudiceabout-people-with-disabilities/.
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and as portraying Maggie’s life as being of such poor quality that it
was not worth living.76 In the real world, many persons who have
suffered disabling injuries have described their gradual shift in
perspective, from wishing for death in the aftermath of the injury to
discovering satisfaction in their life with disability.77 This common,
though not necessarily universal, adaptation to changed life
circumstances and a renewed desire to live lead many in the
disability
community
to
“question
how
truly
autonomous . . . anyone’s wish to die [is] when living with changed,
feared, and uncertain physical impairments . . . .”78
Moreover, disability advocates highlight the importance of
appropriate supports and accommodations in permitting adaptation
and satisfaction with life with a disability.79 By failing to provide
supports allowing independent living in the community and
accommodations making education, employment, and social and
civic engagement possible, society shapes the context in which
people with disabilities make choices about their medical care.80 A
paradigmatic case informing the disability view was David
Rivlin’s.81 While young, Rivlin suffered a spinal cord injury that left
him quadriplegic, but for some period he tried living in the
community, enrolled in college, and got engaged.82 An operation
fifteen years after his original injury left him further disabled and
unable to breathe on his own.83 Rivlin continued to seek to live
independently in Michigan, but the level of funding he could receive
for personal attendants was not sufficient, leaving him confined to a
76. Id. The more recent movie Me Before You, which portrayed the romance between a man with
quadriplegia and his aide, as the man planned to end his life, provoked similar reactions. See Emily
Ladau, Spare Me, “Me Before You”: Hollywood’s New Tearjerker Is Built on Tired and Damaging
Disability Stereotypes, SALON (May 24, 2016, 6:58 PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/05/24/
spare_me_this_tearjerker_romance_me_before_you_is_the_latest_in_an_endless_line_of_disability_obj
ectification/.
77. See Asch, supra note 10, at S32–33.
78. See id. at S33.
79. See id. at S35; Paul K. Longmore, The Strange Death of David Rivlin, 154 W. J. MED. 615, 616
(1991).
80. Longmore, supra note 79, at 615.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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nursing home—for which the state paid.84 Believing he had no
prospect of any other life, Rivlin sought and received approval from a
court in Michigan to have his ventilator disconnected, eighteen years
after his original injury.85
From the disability perspective, Rivlin’s decision to disconnect his
ventilator was not the predictable product of a spinal cord injury and
ventilator dependence.86 Instead, it was the product of the societal
devaluation of life with disability that underpins social policies that
segregate and isolate disabled people in institutions rather than
support their independent living.87 His “choice” to disconnect his
ventilator and die, they suggest, should not be seen as an exercise of
the kind of idealized autonomy that bioethicists extol.88
Even aside from inadequate supports for community living,
negative and ill-informed medical and societal assumptions about the
quality and burdensomeness of disabled life can influence the
decisions of disabled persons.89 Author Harriet McBryde Johnson
emphasizes that the expectations of others—whether voiced or
unspoken—provide part of the context in which disabled persons
make end-of-life decisions:
You know how easy it is to internalize other people’s
expectations, how exhausting it can be to oppose them,
especially when you’re sick. What we confront usually
isn’t homicidal hate, it’s that pervasive assumption that our
lives are inherently bad. That attitude can wear us down to
the point where we want to be killed.90

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Longmore, supra note 79, at 615.
87. Id. at 615–16.
88. Id. Longmore also describes Rivlin’s inability to live outside the nursing home as leaving him
“despondent and despairing,” but points out that he received no psychological counseling in the two
years before he chose to die. Id. at 616.
89. See id.
90. See Mary Johnson, Liberals and Disability Rights: Why Don’t They “Get It?”, RAGGED EDGE
ONLINE (Jan. 26, 2004), http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/focus/liberals0104.html (quoting
statement made by McBryde to Barry Corbet).
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To be sure, not all people with disabilities express such concerns.
Some leading scholars in the disability community reject portrayals
of people with disabilities that emphasize their vulnerability rather
than their agency, arguing that such a portrait reinforces stereotypes
of people with disabilities as weak and in need of protection.91 Other
advocates and scholars argue that respect for autonomy requires that
people with disabilities enjoy a full range of choices involving endof-life care, even including physician-assisted suicide,92 and that
narrowing the range of treatment options for patients may sometime
harm people with disabilities.93
E. Concerns About the Adequacy of Legal Protections
In addition, proponents of liberalized rights to discontinue lifesustaining medical treatment and to physician-assisted suicide often
downplay the types of concerns previously described by emphasizing
the existence of legal and procedural safeguards protecting persons
with disabilities, whether competent or incompetent, from being the
victims of discriminatory decisions to end their lives.94 These legal
safeguards, they may assert, can be trusted to prevent a slide down a
potentially slippery slope towards a regime of permissive euthanasia
where the lives of disabled people are ended without their request or
consent.95 But members of the disability community may not be
willing to trust the legal system much more than they trust the health
care system. As people with disabilities know, able-bodied judges
and lawyers—like their medical counterparts—often fail to
91. See Silvers, supra note 66, at 408.
92. See, e.g., End of Life Liberty Project Moves to CascadiaNow, GEORGETOWN UNIV.: BIOETHICS
RESEARCH LIBRARY (Oct. 31, 2016), https://bioethics.georgetown.edu/2016/10/end-of-life-libertyproject-moves-to-cascadianow/. For example, under the leadership of Kathryn Tucker, a leading
advocate for legalization of the practice variously known as physician aid-in-dying and physicianassisted suicide, in January 2015, the Disability Rights Legal Center launched the End of Life Liberty
Project (ELLP). Id. Both Tucker and the ELLP have since moved from the Disability Rights Legal
Center to the nonprofit organization CascadiaNow! Id.
93. See Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo and the Disability Rights Community: A Cause for Concern,
2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 253, 267–272 (arguing that disability groups’ support of proposed legislation
that would prohibit withholding artificial nutrition and hydration from patients who have never been
competent could in some cases cause suffering for profoundly disabled patients).
94. See Ouellette, supra note 13, at 385.
95. Id. at 385.
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appreciate the value of life with disability and the impact of social
context on choices made by disabled persons.96 After all, a court
sanctioned David Rivlin’s decision to end his life, even though the
surrounding circumstances suggested a decision borne out of
remediable despondency rather than an enduring objection to the use
of a ventilator.97
Others have noted how the language used by some judges deciding
treatment termination cases involving people with disabilities
exhibits devaluation, sometimes bordering on disgust, for the
material conditions of life with disability.98 The poster child for this
judicial depreciation of disabled life is the opinion of the court in
Bouvia v. Superior Court, a case in which a woman with cerebral
palsy and arthritis sought the removal of a nasogastric feeding tube
while she was hospitalized.99 The court upheld Elizabeth Bouvia’s
right to make the autonomous choice to discontinue artificial
nutrition, but only after referring to her as “imprisoned” in her body
and “subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and
dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness.”100 Moreover, the
judge implicated that Bouvia’s physical condition had robbed her life
of “quality, dignity and purpose” and that she could not be faulted if
she found her existence “meaningless.”101 Reading the opinion in
Bouvia,102 it is not hard to understand why some people with
disabilities may not view the legal system as protecting their lives
with the same vigor as it does the lives of able-bodied people who
exhibit a wish to end their lives.
96. Id. at 388.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 83–87.
98. See Asch, supra note 10, at S32; Ouellette, supra note 13, at 387.
99. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986). For background on Elizabeth
Bouvia’s life and the social context of her request, see Longmore, supra note 15.
100. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr., at 305.
101. Id. at 304–05.
102. See id. As Ouellette points out, Bouvia is not the only judicial opinion in which judges have
exhibited a remarkable equating of a disabled person’s need for assistance with breathing, eating,
toileting or other bodily functions with “a childlike state” and indignity. Ouellette, supra note 13, at 387
n.89 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). Such a view is apparently ignorant of the numerous
persons with disabilities who work, parent, enjoy recreational activities, and participate in civic life, and
who also need assistance with their bodily needs. See id. at 388.
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In summary, this part highlights several aspects of concerns often
expressed by members of the disability community regarding the
liberalization of laws regarding the termination of life-sustaining
treatment or physician-assisted dying. As noted, a diversity of views
exists among people with disabilities, some of which the previous
part described.103 Nonetheless, the concerns described can fairly be
said to encapsulate views articulated by many leading disability
rights organizations, disability studies scholars, and disability rights
activists.
II. RECOGNIZING PARALLELS AND “GETTING IT”
The ideas described so far in this essay are not novel; members of
the disability community have been raising them in one form or
another for decades.104 Yet, too often discussions of ending-life
decisions fail to engage these concerns seriously and in a sustained
fashion.105 As noted earlier, most decisions to discontinue lifesustaining medical treatment involve patients who are in some way
disabled, a fact that suggests disability concerns should be at the
center of these discussions rather than a peripheral concern to be
addressed and moved beyond.106
Why have disability concerns not achieved greater traction in these
discussions? Do they not make sense to the physicians, bioethicists,
and lawyers who tend to dominate these discussions? Or, do the
concerns seem overwrought, failing to acknowledge the strength of
the legal protections formally accorded to persons with disabilities?
From the perspective of the disability community, these folks
simply don’t “get it” when it comes to disability concerns about
ending-life decisions.107 This part describes two parallels between the
concerns of the disability community around care-terminating
103. See supra Section I.D.
104. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 90.
105. See, Ouellette, supra note 13, at 372–73 n.3; Johnson, supra note 90.
106. See, e.g., Longmore, supra note 79, at 616; Ouellette, supra note 13, at 372–75, 372 n.3;
Johnson, supra note 90.
107. See Johnson, supra note 90.
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decisions and the concerns of the African-American community
around policing, in hopes that drawing attention to these parallels
might bring home disability concerns in a different way. The
parallels are admittedly not exact, and fully fleshing them out is
beyond the scope of this essay. Perhaps, however, they might make
the disability perspective more accessible to some readers.
Over the past few years, Americans have watched media coverage
of repeated instances of African-American men and boys, many of
them unarmed, being shot and killed by police.108 They have also
seen the growth of the Black Lives Matter movement and other
responses shining a light on systemic racism in the criminal justice
system.109 As a result, many Americans have become familiar with
concepts like implicit bias and white privilege, and have come to
appreciate the justifiable fear of police harassment and violence that
is second nature for many African Americans.110 Compared to five
years ago, I would wager that today many more white Americans at
least have begun to “get it” when it comes to issues of race in
criminal justice. My hope is that suggesting parallels between the
experiences of African Americans and those of people with
disabilities might provide a path towards greater appreciation of
disability community concerns.
A. Legal Protections and Lethal Threats
My inspiration for looking for parallels between the points that
Black Lives Matter makes and the disability perspective on endinglife decisions came from William Peace. Peace is an anthropologist

108. Adrienne LaFrance, Death by Police, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2016/07/monitorial-citizenship-technology/490286/.
109. For example, two books on the topic, Just Mercy by Bryan Stevenson (describing the author’s
work combatting racial and economic injustice in the criminal justice system) and The New Jim Crow:
Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness by Michelle Alexander (describing the mass
incarceration of African-American males) were both New York Times Bestsellers. Bestsellers in
Paperback Nonfiction, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/books/bestsellers/paperback-nonfiction/.
110. See LaFrance, supra note 108; Shannon Richmond, Becoming Consciously White, M.K. GANDHI
INST. FOR NONVIOLENCE, http://www.gandhiinstitute.org/2015/10/26/becoming-consciously-white/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2017).
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and disability rights advocate who uses a wheelchair.111 In his
extensive writing about disability and bioethics, he uses his own
experiences with the health care system and medical profession, as
well the experiences of other people with disabilities.112 He writes of
the suspicion and fear with which many people with disabilities view
the health care system: “[M]ost people with a disability fear even the
most routine hospitalization. We do not fear any of the commonplace
indignities those without a disability worry about when hospitalized.
Our fear is primal—will our lives be considered devoid of value?”113
Peace’s fear of the health care system is not unique. Many
scholars, disability advocates, and activists relay some version of
it.114 Not all of them experience health care providers as a threat to
continued existence, as Peace did.115 Anita Silvers, responding to
Peace, writes: “I’ve not yet believed myself to be fighting for my life
against professional health-care providers. . . . But from childhood
I’ve had to battle healthcare providers to retain effective functionality
despite my physical impairment.”116 The refrain of distrust of health
care providers pervades the literature on disability concerns about
ending-life decisions, and particularly discussions of physicianassisted suicide.117
Peace’s description immediately made me think of similar
statements about fears of police violence against men of color. A
news account of the July 2016 shooting of an unarmed black man,
who was lying on the ground with his hands in the air, explained that
the shooting “illustrates the longstanding fear among black men that
almost any encounter with police can go awry with potentially deadly
results, even when a person follows every law enforcement
command.”118 Scholars have recognized this fear as well: “Based on
111. William J. Peace, Disability Discrimination: The Author Responds, HASTINGS CTR. (July 27,
2012), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/disability-discrimination-the-author-responds.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Ouellette, supra note 13, at 386.
115. See Silvers, supra note 51.
116. Id.
117. See Ouellette, supra note 13, at 379, 386.
118. Jesse J. Holland, Why Black Men Fear That Any Police Encounter Could Go Awry, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (July 21, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/07/21/why-black-men-fear-that-
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personal and shared experiences, blacks believe that the police are
constantly watching them and treat them as if they don’t belong;
blacks fear that every small offense will result in a stop and that
every encounter with the police can escalate and turn ugly.”119 The
existence—and justifiability—of a fear of indignity and harm from
disproportionate policing has even been recognized by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, which ruled in 2016 that a black
man’s running from approaching police does not necessarily give
police reason to suspect his guilt.120 The disproportionate policing of
African American men does not abide only in crime-infested urban
neighborhoods.121 It also affects men in professional roles, even a
U.S. Senator.122
The parallels between blacks’ fears of being physically harmed or
killed by police violence and disabled people’s fears of being
physically harmed or killed by physicians’ treatment choices are
striking to me. In each case, members of a profession charged with
advancing safety or health are feared by a subset of the population.123
Although data on the frequency of and explanation for harmful
actions is woefully limited in each case,124 commentators have
posited that those actions often flow from misperceptions and
implicit bias rather than from overt racism or ableism.125 The
suggestions are that police may be more likely to use lethal force
any-police-encounter-could-go-awry/.
119. CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 47
(2014).
120. Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016). Citing data showing that Boston
police disproportionately stopped black males, the court reasoned, “[s]uch an individual, when
approached by the police, might just as easily be motivated by the desire to avoid the recurring indignity
of being racially profiled as by the desire to hide criminal activity.” Id.
121. See Laura Barron-Lopez, Black GOP Senator Talks About Being Pulled over by Police 7 Times
in One Year, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/tim-scott-pulledover_us_5786bfffe4b08608d332eaa0 (describing personal accounts of racial profiling experienced by
black GOP Senator Tim Scott of South Carolina).
122. See id.
123. See Ouellette, supra note 13, at 386; Holland, supra note 118.
124. Cf. Alex E. Crosby & Bridget Lyons, Assessing Homicides by and of U.S. Law-Enforcement
Officers, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1509 (2016) (considering the value of using public health surveillance
tools to assess the number of killings by law-enforcement).
125. See Cynthia Lee, ‘But I Thought He Had a Gun’–Race and Police Use of Deadly Force, 2
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 1, 9–10 (2004).
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against black men because of culturally prevalent perceptions of
dangerousness and criminality,126 and that doctors may be more
likely to advise against life-sustaining treatments for people with
disabilities because of culturally prevalent perceptions of
burdensomeness and hopelessness.127 The contexts of the
professionals’ decisions are quite different, but both police officers
and physicians must often make decisions quickly and while relying
on ambiguous or incomplete information,128 circumstances that
increase the risk of biases infecting decisions.129
The law does not formally sanction biased treatment in either case,
but neither does it effectively constrain bias-tainted behavior or
provide a reliable remedy to those harmed.130 In short, the law carried
out on the streets—and, in the case of medical choices for disabled
people, the law in the wards—differs from the formal law on the
books.131 Laws that are supposed to protect against biased treatment
are rarely applied to address the harm that is feared.132
Indeed, fears of harm at the hands of police and physicians—the
fears this essay presents to illustrate parallels between the
experiences of African Americans and people with disabilities—
actually overlap substantially. African American patients also express
a fear that doctors will too readily suspend life-sustaining treatment
for them in order to conserve resources.133 And on the flip side of the
126. See id. at 12.
127. See Gill, supra note 6, at 33–34.
128. Julian N. Marewski & Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristic Decision Making in Medicine, 14 DIALOGUES
IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 77, 80 (2012); Michael T. Uttaro, Naturalistic Decision-Making in Law
Enforcement Practice—Exploring the Process 2 (Mar. 26, 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd04102002-114630/unrestricted/Chapters_1-5.pdf. For additional comparisons between medicine and
policing, see Evan D. Anderson & Scott Burris, Policing and Public Health: Not Quite the Right
Analogy, 27 J. POLICING & SOC’Y (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2835461.
129. See Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV.
195, 236–38 (2003).
130. Id. at 276; Crossley, supra note 52, at 55 n.23.
131. See Crossley, supra note 129, at 276-77.
132. Crossley, supra note 52, at 55 n.23.
133. See Fenit Nirappil, Right-to-Die Law Faces Skepticism in Nation’s Capital: ‘It’s Really Aimed at
Old Black People’, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dcpolitics/right-to-die-law-faces-skepticism-in-us-capital-its-really-aimed-at-old-blackpeople/2016/10/17/8abf6334-8ff6-11e6-a6a3-d50061aa9fae_story.html?utm_term=.16cdfa9b116e.
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coin, advocates for people with disabilities have decried how a lack
of police training on how to interact and communicate with persons
who have mental illness or impairments can lead to police
violence.134
To be clear, people with disabilities do not generally assert that
doctors are out to “get [them].”135 Disability Studies scholar Carol
Gill refutes such a claim as a “straw man fallac[y]” that obscures the
true nature of disabled people’s concerns.136 Instead, the problem lies
not in physician animus, but in attitudes that are widespread among
medical professionals and that underestimate the quality of life with a
disability, fail to appreciate the options available for increasing
functionality and independence, and reflect heightened sensitivity to
health care costs.137 Gill writes:
We are, in fact, much more frightened by the doctors who
are out to help us but who see our lives as burdensome and
who know little about options that make life with disability
valuable. We know that the misplaced pity and pessimism
of such doctors is reinforced by the medical institutions
surrounding them, the policies that guide them, and the
health care funding system that rewards them for holding
costs down, and the prevailing culture that influences their
thinking about disability.138
Certainly, some members of the disability community might not
accept the parallels this essay identifies and might honestly disclaim
any distrust or fear of their doctors. The fact that this distrust is not
134. A 2016 report estimates that a third to half of all people killed by police have disabilities. DAVID
M. PERRY & LAWRENCE CARTER-LONG, RUDERMAN FAM. FOUND., THE RUDERMAN WHITE PAPER ON
MEDIA COVERAGE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF FORCE AND DISABILITY 1 (2016),
http://www.rudermanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/MediaStudy-PoliceDisability_finalfinal1.pdf; see also Conor Friedersdorf, Methods That Police Use on the Mentally Ill Are Madness,
ATLANTIC (March 25, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/methods-that-copsuse-with-the-mentally-ill-are-madness/388610/.
135. See Gill, supra note 6, at 33.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 34.
138. Id.
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universal, however, does not undermine the authenticity and validity
of the widely expressed concern. Moreover, recognizing that people
with disabilities as a group may experience harms flowing from
cultural stereotypes devaluing their quality of life need not equate to
a dismissal of their agency, as some disabled proponents of
liberalized choice fear.139
B. Privileged Perspectives and Political Power
The importance of privilege is a second parallel between the
literature presenting disabled people’s concerns about ending-life
decisions and points made by racial justice advocates. In the latter
context, “white privilege” refers to a set of unearned advantages that
white persons benefit from, often unconsciously, simply by virtue of
their skin tone and that function to perpetuate racial hierarchy.140 The
concept is by no means universally accepted, but conversations about
white privilege have become common over the past several years in
settings ranging from higher education to religious congregations.141
Openness to recognizing the existence of white privilege seems to
have increased as media coverage of police shootings and the Black
Lives Matter movement have exposed people across the racial
spectrum to compelling evidence of racial disproportionality in the
criminal justice system.142
Just as the unearned advantages conferred by skin tone may be
invisible to white people until they make an effort to become aware
of those advantages, so too the unearned advantages conferred by an
139. Cf. Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1201–02 (2007) (discussing how critical scholarship has sought “to both engage
and transcend the problematic choices offered by liberal jurisprudence . . . [including] the costs on both
sides of the conventional liberal choice between equal treatment or different treatment, integration or
separation, autonomy or dependence, victimhood or agency”).
140. See Joshua Rothman, The Origins of “Privilege”, NEW YORKER (May 12, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-origins-of-privilege.
141. See, e.g., Thomas Columbus, University Offers Class on ‘The Problem of Whiteness’, COLLEGE
FIX (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.thecollegefix.com/post/30434/; Eric Smith, The Sin of David: A
Sermon on Power and (White) Privilege, PATHEOS: LECTIO (July 26, 2015), http://www.patheos.com/
blogs/lectio/2015/07/the-sin-of-david-a-sermon-on-power-and-white-privilege/.
142. Michael Nam, New Polls: White American Views on Race and Police Starting to Change,
DIVERSITYINC (May 5, 2015), http://www.diversityinc.com/news/new-polls-white-american-views-onrace-and-police-starting-to-change/.
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able body and intact cognitive functioning are often invisible to nondisabled people. Although less widely recognized than white
privilege, feminist and disability scholars and activists have
discussed the existence and effects of “ability privilege” or “ablebodied privilege.”143 According to one commentator, “[a]ble-bodied
privilege allows able-bodied people to maintain experiences of
superiority, perfectability, security and comfort.”144 But able-bodied
people have not earned the privileges145 that accompany having an
able body, and most able-bodied people will not retain that status
throughout their lives.146
The privilege of being abled, rather than disabled, is particularly
relevant to the dynamics of the debate around physician-assisted
suicide. According to Carol Gill, proponents of a right to physicianassisted suicide typically stress how recognizing that right would
further the ideals of autonomy, liberty, and control.147 However, how
their own ability privilege—which, like white privilege, is the
product of social contingencies—affects which values they prioritize
may be invisible to them. This lack of awareness of how privilege
influences their perspective makes appreciating the validity of
perspectives of un-privileged persons more difficult.148 According to
Gill:
Many of the key spokespersons in favor of assisted
suicide . . . are familiar with ideals such as independence,
143. See BOB PEASE, UNDOING PRIVILEGE: UNEARNED ADVANTAGE IN A DIVIDED WORLD 149–58
(2010); Kristina R. Knoll, Feminist Disability Studies Pedagogy, 19 FEMINIST TEACHER 122, 124–36
(2009); cf. Alison Kafer, Compulsory Bodies: Reflections on Heterosexuality and Able-bodiedness, 15 J.
WOMEN’S HISTORY 77, 79 (2003) (discussing the political institution of able-bodiedness and
“compulsory able-bodiedness”).
144. PEASE, supra note 143, at 158.
145. These privileges include, for example, being able to “ignore the width of doors, the presence of
steps and other architectural features of buildings,” not being “dependent on hiring strangers and
acquaintances to assist me with my daily routines and private matters,” and “be[ing] fairly sure that
when people look at me, they don’t assume that I would be better off dead or that I am a social burden
because of my disabilities.” Id. at 159 (quoting Phyllis May-Machunda). The list of unearned
advantages that able-bodied people enjoy is quite long. Id. at 158 (noting a non-exhaustive list of 49
privileges).
146. Id. at 160.
147. See Gill, supra note 6, at 31.
148. See PEASE, supra note 143, at 158.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss4/2

26

Crossley: Ending-Life Decisions: Some Disability Perspectives

2017]

ENDING-LIFE DECISIONS: DISABILITY PERSPECTIVES

919

control, and freedom because they are by and large from
the dominant sector of society that has had access to those
experiences. . . . They have enjoyed a good deal of control,
know exactly what they have to lose, and are determined to
retain it until death. Unfortunately, viewing the world from
a position of privilege may limit one’s insight into the
consequences of a policy change whose greatest impact
could fall on socially marginalized groups.149
Ideally, recognizing the existence and impact of ability privilege in
discussions about ending-life decisions would encourage greater
openness to the validity of the perspectives that disabled people offer
on the subject. Just as white people in America increasingly
recognize that people of color often face a different reality in their
interactions with the police,150 non-disabled people could recognize
that people with disabilities face a different reality in their
interactions with the health care system.
Beyond matters of perspective, recognizing the existence of ability
privilege also reveals how raw political power lurks in the
background of discussions of ending-life decisions. Just as racial
justice advocates assert that white privilege serves to reinforce racial
hierarchies that are deeply rooted in our society,151 disability activists
point to ability privilege as entrenching social, economic, and

149. Gill, supra note 6, at 31–32 (“What control-seekers want for their own peace of mind may work
out quite well for them in the context of privilege and choice. However, they cannot determine how it
will work out for their neighbors who reside outside that context.”). Gill’s recognition that “socially
marginalized groups” broadly may be disproportionately affected by the legalization of physicianassisted suicide echoes the concerns that African-Americans express regarding the practice. Id.
150. Although a wide divide remains between blacks’ and whites’ views on how police treat
minorities, surveys in recent years have shown modest increases in the percentage of whites who believe
that blacks in their communities are treated less fairly by police than whites. See Public Opinion
Context: Americans, Race, and Police, GALLUP (July 8, 2016) http://www.gallup.com/opinion/pollingmatters/193586/public-opinion-context-americans-race-police.aspx (reporting finding that percentage
increased from 34% in 2015 to 40% in 2016); see also Nam, supra note 142.
151. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1299–1300 (2004) (asserting, in discussing mass incarceration,
that “[s]tructural racism systematically maintains racial hierarchies established in prior eras by
embedding white privilege and nonwhite disadvantage in policies, institutions, and cultural
representations”).
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political structures that exclude people with disabilities.152 In short,
when disability advocates challenge the priority that mainstream
bioethicists place on choice and autonomy in medical decisions about
ending life, they are attempting to wrest power from those
bioethicists.153 As Stephen Drake wrote on the Not Dead Yet blog,
criticizing the dominance that the bioethics community has exercised
over discussions of end-of-life policy: “At the core, this is a political
struggle over public policy—a struggle between those who have
power and seek to hold onto it and those directly affected by the
policies who want to take power.”154 From the perspective of
disability advocates, bioethicists have for too long had the power to
set the terms of discussions about practices that primarily affect
people with disabilities.155 This power to frame policy debates
provokes disability activists to demand, once again: “Nothing About
Us Without Us!”156 And, while mainstream bioethicists may maintain
their neutrality and objectivity in setting those terms, they rarely
acknowledge how their invisible ability privilege affects how they
frame discussions.157
CONCLUSION
This essay described the nature of disability concerns about
ending-life decisions and suggested two parallels between those
disability concerns and the concerns of the African-American
community regarding policing.158 The essay’s purpose in identifying
152. Gregor Wolbring, Ability Privilege: A Needed Addition to Privilege Studies, 12 J. CRITICAL
ANIMAL STUD. 118, 120 (2014).
153. Stephen Drake, Disability and Ethics Conference This Weekend—Low Expectations Based on
Past Performance, NOT DEAD YET (May 19, 2010), http://notdeadyet.org/2010/05/disability-and-ethicsconference-this.html.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (showing photo of disability activists protesting a bioethics conference).
157. Cf. PEASE, supra note 143, at 158.
158. See supra Sections II.A, II.B. Other apparent parallels may also emerge upon further
examination. Earlier in the essay, I described how important social context is to understanding fully the
nature of a disabled person’s choice to terminate life-sustaining medical care. See supra Part II.
Similarly, discussions of crime rates in the African-American community stress the need to consider
such data in its full social context. See supra Section II.A.
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and beginning to tease out those parallels is to offer readers a
different perspective on the concerns that leaders of the disability
community often voice. My hope is that, viewed from this different
perspective, the social justice character of those concerns will
become more evident.
Comparing the fear or distrust that many people with disabilities
experience when encountering the health care system with the fear or
distrust that many African-Americans feel when encountering the law
enforcement system shows a common apprehension of being
subjected to biased treatment by authority figures that—while not
legally sanctioned—has not to date been adequately recognized or
addressed.159 Similarly, recognizing that an unawareness of the
unearned advantages of privilege obscures the bias inherent in
culturally-prevalent assumptions about blackness and disability may
also help reveal the unjust nature of decisions flowing from those
assumptions. If we acknowledge that the benefits of privilege,
whether based on skin tone or able body, are unearned, then how we
view disability concerns may shift.
That shift highlights the social justice implications of ending-life
decisions and thus should affect how we address the disability
concerns this essay describes. Assessing whether autonomy—as
idealized by mostly able-bodied, well-educated, and powerful
bioethicists, physicians, and attorneys—should override disabled
persons’ concerns entails weighing the values of autonomy and
justice. So framed, the possibility exists that disability advocates and
proponents of liberalized standards for end-of-life decision-making
might find points of agreement and ways to move the discussion
forward. In addressing this subject more than a decade ago, Adrienne
Asch wrote of the importance of drawing disability activists and
scholars into discussions of end-of-life policy, deliberations
regarding health care resource allocation, and the education of health
professionals,160 but those aspirations have not been sufficiently
realized. Recognizing that the law and ethics of end-of-life decisions
159. See supra Part II; see also Gill, supra note 6, at 33; Holland, supra note 118.
160. See Asch, supra note 10, at S36.
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must give equal respect to the demands of justice, as well as to the
promise of autonomy, is a step in the right direction.
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